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LESS IS NOT MORE: EVIDENCE OF MERE PROXIMITY
IN STATE V. GURSKE DOES NOT RENDER THE
DEFENDANT ARMED UNDER WASHINGTON'S DEADLY
WEAPON SPECIAL VERDICT STATUTE
Kelly B. Fennerty
Abstract: In State v. Gurske, Division III of the Washington State Court of Appeals
affirmed the application of Washington State's Deadly Weapon Special Verdict statute to
Samuel Gurske's conviction for possession of methamphetamine. The Deadly Weapon
Special Verdict statute enhances the sentence of a defendant who commits a crime while
"armed" with a deadly weapon. In Gurske, the parties stipulated that a backpack holding
Gurske's pistol and drugs lay within arm's reach of the driver's position. From this fact, the
trial judge determined that Gurske was armed while he was in possession of
methamphetamine. Under Washington State Supreme Court precedent, however, a court must
apply two tests in constructive possession cases like Gurske to determine whether the
defendant is armed. First, the weapon must be easily accessible and readily available for use
(the "easily accessible" test). Second, there must be a nexus between the weapon and the
defendant (weapon-defendant nexus) and between the weapon and the crime (weapon-crime
nexus). The Gurske court determined that Gurske's proximity to the weapon satisfied the
easily accessible test. Again relying on the proximity between the defendant, the weapon, and
the drugs, the Gurske court determined that proximity also satisfied the nexus test. Although
proximity may satisfy the easily accessible test and the weapon-defendant nexus, a plurality
of the Washington State Supreme Court in State v. Schelin explicitly required more than
proximity to satisfy the weapon-crime nexus. According to Schelin, courts should consider
three factors: the nature of the crime, the type of weapon, and the circumstances under which
police discovered the weapon. These three factors identify evidence that may permit an
inference that a defendant used a weapon in furtherance of the commission of a crime.
Assuming that the State also presented evidence satisfying the easily accessible test and the
weapon-defendant nexus, the addition of this inference establishes a defendant as armed. In
light of the three Schelin factors, the Gurske evidence does not support the inference that
Gurske used the weapon in furtherance of his drug crime. The trial judge, therefore,
mistakenly found a weapon-crime nexus, and Division III erroneously affirmed the trial
judge's application of the sentence enhancement. On appeal, the Washington State Supreme
Court should reverse the application of the Deadly Weapon Special Verdict statute to
Gurske's conviction for possession of methamphetamine.
Samuel Gurske made an illegal left turn while driving through
Pullman, Washington.' An officer stopped Gurske, arrested him for
driving with a suspended license, and impounded his truck.2 Behind the
1. State v. Gurske, 120 Wash. App. 63, 64, 83 P.3d 1051, 1052 (2004) review granted, 152 Wash.
2d 1013, 101 P.3d 108 (2004).
2. Id.
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driver's seat, 3 police later found a zipped-closed backpack, , which
contained three grams of methamphetamine, an unloaded pistol in a
holster, a loaded magazine, and Gurske's wallet. Because the backpack
lay within arm's reach of the driver's position, the trial judge applied
Washington State's Deadly Weapon Special Verdict statute (Deadly
Weapon Enhancement) to Gurske's conviction and enhanced his
sentence for possession of a controlled substance.6
The Deadly Weapon Enhancement permits a prosecutor to seek a
special verdict that enhances a defendant's sentence if the defendant
committed the underlying crime while "armed" with a deadly weapon.'
In 1986, the Washington State Supreme Court held that a defendant is
armed if a weapon is easily accessible and readily available for use (the
"easily accessible" test).8 However, if the evidence establishes only that
a defendant constructively possessed a deadly weapon, he or she is not
armed merely because the weapon was easily accessible. 9 In State v.
Schelin, 10 a plurality of the Washington State Supreme Court held that
defendants who constructively possess a deadly weapon are not armed
for purposes of the Deadly Weapon Enhancement unless the State proves
a nexus between both the weapon and the defendant (the weapon-
defendant nexus) and the weapon and the crime (the weapon-crime
nexus)." The Schelin plurality further explained that the weapon-crime
nexus exists where the evidence entitles the trier of fact to infer that the
defendant was using the weapon in a manner connecting it to
3. Id.
4. Id. at 67, 83 P.3d at 1054 (Schultheis, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 65-66, 83 P.3d at 1052-53.
6. Id. at 64-65, 83 P.3d at 1052.
7. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.602 (2004) (formerly codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9.94A.125).
8. See State v. Valdobinos, 122 Wash. 2d 270, 282, 858 P.2d 199, 206 (1993) (construing Deadly
Weapon Enhancement under its former codification at RCW 9.94A.125). The Valdobinos court
adopted the "easily accessible and readily available" test from State v. Sabala, 44 Wash. App. 444,
448, 723 P.2d 5, 8 (1986). See Valdobinos, 122 Wash. 2d at 282, 858 P.2d at 206.
9. State v. Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d 562, 567, 55 P.3d 632, 635 (2002) (plurality opinion) (citing
Valdobinos, 122 Wash. 2d at 282, 858 P.2d at 206).
10. 147 Wash. 2d 562, 55 P.3d 632 (2002).
11. See id. at 567-68, 55 P.3d at 636. This is a holding because, in addition to the plurality, Chief
Justice Alexander, Justice Sanders, and Justice Chambers agreed that the State should have to prove
this two-part nexus beyond a reasonable doubt to render a defendant armed. See id. at 577, 55 P.3d
at 640 (Alexander, C.J., concurring); id at 586, 55 P.3d at 644 (Sanders, J., dissenting); id. at 602,
55 P.3d at 652 (Chambers, J., dissenting). At trial, the jury found the defendant was armed with a
deadly weapon pursuant to former RCW 9.94A.125. Id. at 565, 55 P.3d at 634.
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commission of the crime. 12 The trier of fact's entitlement to make the
inference hinges on three factors: the nature of the crime, the type of
weapon, and the circumstances under which the weapon was found.
13
The Supreme Court of Washington has since affirmed the nexus
requirement by holding that the mere presence of a deadly weapon at the
crime scene does not establish that a defendant was armed.
14
In Gurske, Division III of the Washington State Court of Appeals
upheld the application of the Deadly Weapon Enhancement to Gurske's
sentence for possession of methamphetamine. 15 Limiting its analysis to
the proximity between Gurske, the gun, and the drugs, Division III found
that this proximity alone satisfied both the easily accessible test and each
part of the nexus test. 16 The court agreed with the trial judge's
determination that Gurske was armed because the backpack containing
the gun, the drugs, and Gurske's wallet lay within arm's reach of the
driver's seat.
17
This Note argues that the Gurske court misinterpreted Schelin and
failed to apply the weapon-crime nexus test when considering whether
Gurske was armed. Schelin requires a court to apply two separate tests in
constructive possession cases like Gurske: the easily accessible test and
the two-part nexus test.' 8 The Gurske court effectively collapsed the two
tests into a single test of proximity by relying solely on the close
proximity between the defendant, the weapon, and the drugs to find
Gurske armed. 19 While proximity between the defendant and the weapon
alone may satisfy the easily accessible test and the weapon-defendant
nexus requirement,20 mere proximity between the defendant, the weapon,
12. See id. at 574-75, 55 P.3d at 639.
13. See id. at 570, 55 P.3d at 637.
14. See State v. Barnes, No. 74408-4, 2005 WL 66458, at *2 (Wash. Jan. 13, 2005) (challenging
jury instructions for Deadly Weapon Enhancement); State v. Willis, No. 74561-7, 2005 WL 20516,
at *4 (Wash. Jan. 6, 2006) (challenging jury instructions for Deadly Weapon Enhancement). Barnes
and Willis affirmed Schelin's nexus requirement and considered the nexus test in the context ofjury
instructions. See Barnes, 2005 WL 66458 at *2; Willis, 2005 WL 20516 at *4.
15. State v. Gurske, 120 Wash. App. 63, 64, 83 P.3d 1051, 1052 (2004), review granted, 152
Wash. 2d 1013, 101 P.3d 108 (2004).
16. See id. at 66, 83 P.3d at 1053.
17. See id. at 64-66, 83 P.3d at 1052-53.
18. See Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 567-68, 55 P.3d at 635-36.
19. See Gurske, 120 Wash. App. at 64, 83 P.3d at 1052 (affirming trial judge's conclusion that
defendant was armed for purposes of Deadly Weapon Enhancement because backpack, which
contained defendant's wallet, drugs, and pistol, was within arm's reach).
20. See, e.g., Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 574, 55 P.3d at 639 (concluding direct evidence of
Schelin's close proximity to weapon when police officers entered his home satisfied easily
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and the drugs in a narcotics possession case does not satisfy the weapon-
crime nexus requirement. 2' Based on the nature of Gurske's crime, the
type of weapon, and the circumstances under which police found the
weapon, the Gurske court should have determined that the evidence did
not establish a weapon-crime nexus. Thus, the evidence did not entitle
the trial judge to infer that Gurske was using the weapon in connection
with the crime.22 By failing to satisfy both parts of the nexus test and by
affirming the Deadly Weapon Enhancement on the basis of mere
constructive possession,23 the Gurske court erred in affirming the trial
judge's finding that Gurske was armed.
Part I of this Note describes Washington State's Deadly Weapon
Enhancement. Part II examines the interpretation by Washington State
courts of the term "armed" under the Deadly Weapon Enhancement.
Part III discusses the Gurske court's application of the Deadly Weapon
Enhancement and its failure to apply both of the required tests. Part IV
argues that Division III erred in failing to apply both tests. It further
argues that proper application of the weapon-crime nexus and the three
Schelin factors would not support an inference that Gurske was using his
weapon in connection with the crime. This Note concludes that the
Washington State Supreme Court should reverse the trial judge's finding
that Gurske was armed. The Deadly Weapon Enhancement should not
apply to Gurske's sentence.
I. WASHINGTON LAW ENHANCES SENTENCES FOR CRIMES
COMMITTED WHILE ARMED WITH A DEADLY WEAPON
Washington State's Deadly Weapon Enhancement increases the
sentence associated with a criminal defendant's conviction when the
defendant committed a crime while armed with a deadly weapon.24 The
accessible test and weapon-defendant nexus).
21. See id. at 569-70, 55 P.3d at 637 (concluding State must prove existence of nexus between
weapon, crime, and defendant, in addition to proving proximity to weapon).
22. Cf id. at 574-75, 55 P.3d at 639 (concluding jury was entitled to infer defendant was using
weapon in furtherance of crime because evidence established defendant constructively possessed
weapon to protect marijuana-growing operation).
23. See Gurske, 120 Wash. App. at 65-66, 83 P.3d at 1053. But see Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at
575-76, 55 P.3d at 639-40 (stating Deadly Weapon Enhancement authorizes court to find defendant
armed only when evidence satisfies both easily accessible test and nexus test). "The requirement of
a nexus... guards against a deadly weapon enhancement being found whenever constructive
possession is established." Id. at 575, 55 P.3d 639.
24. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.602 (2004). The statute states, in relevant part, that
[i]n a criminal case wherein there has been a special allegation and evidence establishing that
Vol. 80:165, 2005
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Deadly Weapon Enhancement requires the State to allege specifically
that the accused committed the crime while armed with a deadly
weapon;25 the State must then prove this allegation beyond a reasonable
doubt.26 The statute provides a nonexclusive list of instruments that
constitute "deadly weapons," 27 which includes loaded and unloaded
firearms.28 However, the statute does not define the term "armed. 29
Therefore, Washington courts have set forth tests to establish whether a
defendant is armed for purposes of the Deadly Weapon Enhancement.30
The Washington State Legislature added the Deadly Weapon
Enhancement to Washington State's sentencing reform act in 1983.31 It
intended to enhance the sentences of those defendants who commit
crimes while armed because a defendant's use of a weapon makes a
crime more dangerous and thus more serious.3 Lacking a statutory
definition of the term "armed," Washington courts construe the term in
light of the statute's purpose.33 The statute's underlying rationale applies
when evidence shows that a defendant was using the weapon in
the accused... was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the commission of the crime,
the court shall make a finding of fact of whether or not the accused.., was armed with a
deadly weapon at the time of the commission of the crime.
Id. The enhancement does not constitute a separate crime. Rather, the enhancement increases the
underlying sentence for the substantive offense based on the manner in which the defendant
committed the crime. See 13A SETH A. FINE & DOUGLAS J. ENDE, WASHINGTON PRACTICE,
CRIMINAL LAW § 109 (2d ed. 1998) ("The possession or use of a deadly weapon can greatly
increase the punishment for many crimes.... [B]eing armed with a deadly weapon while
committing a felony enhances the sentence for that felony.").
25. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.602.
26. See State v. Pam, 98 Wash. 2d 748, 755-56, 659 P.2d 454, 458 (1983) (citing State v. Tongate,
93 Wash. 2d 751, 754-55, 613 P.2d 121, 123 (1980)).
27. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.602.
28. See Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 567 n.2, 55 P.3d at 635 n.2 (citing Washington Pattern Jury
Instructions: Criminal 2.07.02 at 37 (2d ed. 1994); State v. Sullivan, 47 Wash. App. 81, 85, 733 P.2d
598, 600 (1987)).
29. See State v. Mills, 80 Wash. App. 231, 235, 907 P.2d 316, 317 (1995) (citing WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.94A.125 (current version at WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.602 (2004)).
30. See, e.g., Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 567, 55 P.3d at 635 (discussing meaning of armed). On
appeal, whether a defendant was armed is a mixed question of law and fact. See id. at 565-66, 55
P.3d at 634-35. Assuming the truth of the underlying facts, the determination of whether the facts
establish that a defendant was armed is reviewable.de novo. See id. at 566, 55 P.3d at 635.
31. See Violent Offense Category Expanded-Exceptional Sentences for Certain Felonies-
Deadly Weapon Special Verdict-Sentencing Guidelines-Report on Sentencing Reform Act, ch.
163, § 3, 1983 Wash. Laws 713, 717.
32. See State v. Johnson, 94 Wash. App. 882, 896, 974 P.2d 855, 862 (1999).
33. See State v. Sullivan, 143 Wash. 2d 162, 174-75, 19 P.3d 1012, 1019 (2001); State v. Wilson,
125 Wash. 2d 212, 216-17, 883 P.2d 320, 322-23 (1994).
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connection with a crime. 4 The word "armed" therefore requires a
connection between the weapon and the crime itself. 35 The Washington
State Legislature did not intend to impose an absolute prohibition on
weapon possession by enhancing a defendant's sentence merely because
36he or she commits a crime on premises containing a weapon. Rather, to
prove that a defendant was armed, the State must present evidence
showing more than mere constructive possession of a weapon.37
II. IN CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION CASES, THE STATE
MUST SATISFY TWO TESTS TO PROVE A DEFENDANT
WAS ARMED
The Washington State courts' definition of "constructive possession"
relates to the legal ownership of property and an individual's
corresponding right to the immediate actual possession of that
property.38 In the context of the Deadly Weapon Enhancement, the
Washington State Supreme Court has limited the definition of
constructive possession of a deadly weapon to the potential to exercise
immediate or spontaneous dominion and control over it. 3 9 Where a
defendant constructively possesses a deadly weapon, the Washington
State Supreme Court requires the State to satisfy two distinct tests to
prove that the defendant is armed under the Deadly Weapon
Enhancement. 40 First, the State must prove that a deadly weapon was
easily accessible and readily available for use, either for offensive or
41defensive purposes. Mere constructive possession of a weapon,
regardless of the weapon's easy accessibility, is insufficient to prove that
a defendant is armed within the meaning of the statute.42 Second, the
34. See, e.g., Johnson, 94 Wash. App. at 895-96, 974 P.2d at 862.
35. See Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 575, 55 P.3d at 639 (holding nexus requirement connects
weapon to crime, thereby "guard[ing] against a deadly weapon enhancement being found whenever
constructive possession is established").
36. See Johnson, 94 Wash. App. at 896-97, 974 P.2d at 862.
37. See Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 575, 55 P.3d at 639.
38. See State v. Parent, 123 Wash. 624, 627, 212 P. 1061, 1062 (1923).
39. See State v. Rieger, 26 Wash. App. 321, 325, 613 P.2d 163, 166 (1980) (construing WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.41.025), overruled on other grounds by State v. McKim, 98 Wash. 2d 111,653 P.2d
1040 (1982).
40. See Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 567-68, 55 P.3d at 635-36.
41. See State v. Valdobinos, 122 Wash. 2d 270, 282, 858 P.2d 199, 206 (1993).
42. See id.
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State must also satisfy an independent "nexus" test.43 The nexus test
requires the State to prove that a nexus existed between the deadly
weapon and the defendant as well as between the deadly weapon and the
crime. 4
A. A Defendant Is Armed if a Deadly Weapon Is Easily Accessible
During Commission of a Crime, but Mere Constructive Possession
Is Insufficient
In State v. Valdobinos,45 the Washington State Supreme Court held
that a defendant is armed during the commission of a crime if a deadly
weapon is easily accessible and readily available for use, either for
offensive or defensive purposes.46 Valdobinos challenged the application
of the Deadly Weapon Enhancement to his sentence for possession of
cocaine with intent to deliver. After arresting Valdobinos, national
guardsmen discovered an unloaded rifle and a black bag containing a
large sum of cash and 846 grams of cocaine under a bed in his mobile
home.48 The Valdobinos court concluded that the defendant was not
armed during the commission of his crime because the unloaded rifle
under his bed was not easily accessible and readily available. 49 Thus,
when the evidence shows only that a defendant, like Valdobinos, has
constructive possession of a deadly weapon,50 the defendant is not armed
under the Deadly Weapon Enhancement. 1
A defendant possesses a weapon when he or she owns, has custody of,
or controls the weapon. 52 Possession may amount to either actual
possession or constructive possession. 53 Actual possession consists of
"actual physical possession." 54 On the other hand, constructive
43. See Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 575-76, 55 P.3d at 639-40.
44. See id. at 568, 55 P.3d at 636.
45. 122 Wash. 2d 270, 858 P.2d 199 (1993).
46. See id. at 282, 858 P.2d at 206 (citing State v. Sabala, 44 Wash. App. 444, 448, 723 P.2d 5, 8
(1986)).
47. Id. at 281, 858 P.2d at 206.
48. Id. at 274, 858 P.2d at 202. The bag contained $1,875. Id.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 282, 858 P.2d at 206.
51. See State v. Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d 562, 567, 55 P.3d 632, 635 (2002) (plurality opinion);
Valdobinos, 122 Wash. 2d at 282, 858 P.2d at 206.
52. See State v. Simonson, 91 Wash. App. 874, 881, 960 P.2d 955, 959 (1998).
53. See id.
54. See id.
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possession exists when the defendant lacks actual physical possession
but has "dominion and control" of the weapon and may "immediately
exercise" such control. 55 Though he lacked actual physical possession of
the deadly weapon under his bed, Valdobinos constructively possessed
the rifle while possessing cocaine.56 Despite this constructive possession,
the court determined that he was not armed within the meaning of the
Deadly Weapon Enhancement. 7 Therefore, even when a defendant has
the ability to exercise immediate control over a deadly weapon,
constructive possession alone does not render the defendant armed under
the Deadly Weapon Enhancement.58
After Valdobinos, the Washington State Court of Appeals grappled
with the application of the Deadly Weapon Enhancement in constructive
possession cases.59 Although the Valdobinos court established that
constructive possession alone does not render a defendant armed,6° it did
not identify what additional facts would suffice. 61 Thus, under the easily
accessible test, lower courts lacked clear direction as to what evidence
would render a defendant armed under the Deadly Weapon
Enhancement in constructive possession cases.62
B. In Addition to the Easily Accessible Test, the State Must Satisfy a
Two-Part Nexus Test to Prove a Defendant Was Armed
In Schelin, the Washington State Supreme Court upheld the easily
accessible test and articulated a second, independent test for constructive
55. See id.; see also State v. Call, 75 Wash. App. 866, 868, 880 P.2d 571, 571 (1994) (noting
defendant's dominion and control over premises, established by numerous documents in house,
demonstrated constructive possession of handguns therein).
56. See Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 567, 55 P.3d at 635 (discussing Valdobinos, 122 Wash. 2d at
282, 858 P.2d at 206).
57. See Valdobinos, 122 Wash. 2d at 282, 858 P.2d at 206.
58. See Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 567-68, 55 P.3d at 635-36.
59. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 94 Wash. App. 882, 894-95, 974 P.2d 855, 861 (1999)
(disagreeing with decision of Division I1 in State v. Simonson, 91 Wash. App. 874, 960 P.2d 955
(1998)); State v. Mills, 80 Wash. App. 231, 235-36, 907 P.2d 316, 318 (1995) (recognizing
differing outcomes in various court of appeals decisions applying Deadly Weapon Enhancement).
60. See Valdobinos, 122 Wash. 2d at 282, 858 P.2d at 206 (holding mere constructive possession,
established by "evidence that an unloaded rifle was found under [a bed], without more, is
insufficient to qualify [a defendant] as 'armed.' under easily accessible test (emphasis added)).
61. See id. (noting insufficient evidence, but refraining from identifying what additional evidence
would have sufficed).
62. See Johnson, 94 Wash. App. at 893, 974 P.2d at 860.
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possession cases.63 Police found Schelin in his basement, standing next
to a loaded gun that hung on the wall near his marijuana-growing
operation. 64 To determine whether Schelin was armed, the Schelin
plurality, after reviewing the decisions of the Washington State Court of
Appeals, imposed a "nexus" requirement in constructive possession
cases. 65 The Schelin plurality explained the nexus test as a two-part test
requiring a nexus between the deadly weapon and the defendant as well
as between the deadly weapon and the crime. 66 Requiring this nexus
protects the right to bear arms.6 7 Specifically, the requirement of a two-
part nexus guards against application of the Deadly Weapon
Enhancement whenever mere constructive possession exists.68
1. The Weapon-Defendant Nexus Test Requires Proximity Between
the Weapon and the Defendant
Proximity between a deadly weapon and a defendant satisfies the
weapon-defendant nexus test.69 Because proximity may demonstrate that
a weapon is easily accessible,7 ° facts that satisfy the easily accessible test
63. See Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 567-70, 55 P.3d at 636-37. Although Schelin is a plurality
opinion, a majority of the court agreed that the State must prove a nexus between the defendant, the
crime, and the deadly weapon. Justices Smith, Bridge, and Owens joined Justice Ireland's plurality
opinion. Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 576, 55 P.3d at 640. Chief Justice Alexander wrote a separate
concurring opinion to clarify that the jury instruction in Schelin should have required the State to
prove this nexus. See id. at 576-77, 55 P.3d at 640 (Alexander, C.J., concurring). Justice Sanders
filed a dissenting opinion that agreed that a nexus test was required, but disagreed as to whether the
evidence was sufficient to satisfy this test. See id. at 579-601, 55 P.3d at 640-52 (Sanders, J.,
dissenting). Justice Johnson, joined by Justice Madsen, agreed with Justice Sanders that the
evidence was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Deadly Weapon Enhancement. See id. at
577-79, 55 P.3d at 652 (Johnson, J., concurring in dissent). Justice Chambers also agreed with
Justice Sanders that the State proved nothing more than constructive possession, which was
insufficient to support the application of the Deadly Weapon Enhancement. See id. at 601-02, 55
P.3d at 652 (Chambers, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 564, 55 P.3d at 634.
65. See id. at 567-70, 55 P.3d at 636-37 (approving Valdobinos, 122 Wash. 2d 270, 858 P.2d
199; Johnson, 94 Wash. App. 882, 974 P.2d 855; State v. Mills, 80 Wash. App. 231, 907 P.2d 316
(1995); State v. Call, 75 Wash. App. 866, 880 P.2d 571 (1994); State v. Taylor, 74 Wash. App. I11,
872 P.2d 53 (1994); State v. Sabala, 44 Wash. App. 444, 723 P.2d 5 (1986)).
66. See id. at 568, 55 P.3d at 636.
67. See id. at 575, 55 P.3d at 639.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 568-69, 55 P.3d at 636; see also Mills, 80 Wash. App. at 236-37, 907 P.2d at 318
(concluding defendant was not armed for purposes of Deadly Weapon Enhancement where he was
several miles from weapon).
70. See Valdobinos, 122 Wash. 2d at 282, 858 P.2d at 206 (noting that in Sabala, 44 Wash. App.
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may also satisfy the weapon-defendant nexus test. 71 In articulating the
evidentiary requirements for the weapon-defendant nexus, the Schelin
plurality examined the analyses in several appellate court cases.72 First,
in State v. Taylor, 73a weapon-defendant nexus existed where the
defendant's unloaded gun and ammunition clip were inside a bag that sat
on the table directly next to him.74 In contrast, this nexus did not exist in
State v. Mills,75 where police arrested the defendant several miles from
the motel room that contained his weapon and illegal narcotics. 76 In
Schelin, the plurality concluded that a weapon-defendant nexus existed
where the defendant stood within feet of his loaded gun when police
entered his home.7 7 Thus, the Schelin plurality agreed with the lower
courts that proximity satisfies the weapon-defendant nexus
requirement.78
2. The Weapon-Crime Nexus Test Requires Analysis of Three Factors
To determine the existence of a nexus between the weapon and the
crime, courts must examine the nature of the crime, the type of weapon,
and the circumstances under which the weapon was found.7 9 The Schelin
plurality adopted the weapon-crime nexus requirement after reviewing
the decision of Division I of the Washington State Court of Appeals in
State v. Johnson.80 The Schelin plurality agreed with the Johnson court's
conclusion that the mere presence of a weapon at a crime scene does not
establish a weapon-crime nexus. 81 Rather, the State must present
at 448, 723 P.2d at 8, a gun within reach of defendant was considered easily accessible).
71. See, e.g., Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 574, 55 P.3d at 639 (determining direct evidence that
defendant stood within feet of loaded gun hanging on wall established "close proximity" of weapon
to defendant, which satisfied both easily accessible test and nexus between weapon and defendant).
72. See id. at 568-69, 55 P.3d at 636.
73. 74 Wash. App. 111, 872 P.2d 53 (1994).
74. See id. at 124-26, 872 P.2d at 60-61 (finding no violation of defendant's constitutional rights
because "the gun and the crime were sufficiently connected").
75. 80 Wash. App. 231, 907 P.2d 316 (1995).
76. See id. at 237, 907 P.2d at 318.
77. See Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 574, 55 P.3d at 639.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 570, 55 P.3d at 637.
80. 94 Wash. App. 882, 974 P.2d 855 (1999); see Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 569-70, 55 P.3d at
636-37.
81. See Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 570, 55 P.3d at 637 (citing Johnson, 94 Wash. App. at 895, 974
P.2d at 861).
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additional evidence that entitles the trier of fact to infer that a defendant
was using a weapon in furtherance of the crime. 82 A weapon-crime
nexus thus exists when a defendant maintained or protected the illegal
possession, manufacture, or delivery of narcotics by constructively
possessing a deadly weapon. 83 The three Schelin factors-nature of the
crime, type of weapon, and the circumstances under which the weapon is
found-frame this inference. 84 The weapon-crime nexus exists if the
evidence entitles the trier of fact to make the necessary inference. 85
The Schelin plurality derived the three factors from appellate court
decisions that required a nexus between the weapon and the crime.86 In
State v. Sabala,87 Division III affirmed the trial court's finding that
Sabala was armed. 88 Sabala contended that he was denied his
constitutional right to bear arms because no nexus existed between the
weapon and the crime. 89 The Sabala court determined that the facts
supported the trial court's finding of a weapon-crime nexus: 90 by placing
his fully loaded semi-automatic pistol on the floorboard directly under
his seat, the defendant intentionally positioned it to be easily accessible
during the delivery of twenty-five grams of heroin. 91 Evidence regarding
the location and position of the gun, the fact that it was fully loaded, and
the fact that it was available for the defendant's use while driving
supported the trial court's finding that Sabala was armed.92 Similarly, in
State v. Taylor,93 evidence that the defendant sat next to a gun in the
midst of a host of illegal narcotics, implements commonly used for
measuring and packaging, and a significant amount of cash supported
the finding of a weapon-crime nexus.94 In State v. Simonson,95 Division
82. See id. at 574-75, 55 P.3d at 639 (approving State v. Mills, 80 Wash. App. 231, 235, 907 P.2d
316, 317 (1995)); see also Mills, 80 Wash. App. at 235, 907 P.2d at 317 ("[A] defendant in
constructive possession of a deadly weapon, even ifthat weapon is next to controlled substances, is
not 'armed."' (emphasis added)).
83. See Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 572, 55 P.3d at 638.
84. See id. at 570, 55 P.3d at 637.
85. See id. at 574, 55 P.3d at 639.
86. See id. at 567-70, 55 P.3d at 636-37.
87. 44 Wash. App. 444, 723 P.2d 5 (1986).
88. Id. at 449, 723 P.2d at 8.
89. Id. at 448-49, 723 P.2d at 8.
90. Id. at 448, 723 P.2d at 8.
91. Id. at 445-46, 723 P.2d at 6.
92. See id. at 449, 723 P.2d at 8.
93. 74 Wash. App. 111, 872 P.2d 53 (1994).
94. See id. at 123-25, 872 P.2d at 59-60 (finding no violation of defendant's constitutional rights
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II also found a weapon-crime nexus where police discovered a gun in
the mud next to the defendant's methamphetamine laboratory, in
addition to several guns in a nearby trailer, after the lab exploded.96 This
evidence permitted an inference that the defendant arranged the weapons
to allow easy access to them in order to defend the laboratory.97
After reviewing these cases, the Schelin plurality acknowledged that
courts in earlier cases had considered three factors-the nature of the
crime, the type of weapon, and the circumstances under which the
weapon was found-to determine whether the evidence permitted an
inference that the defendant was using the weapon in connection with
the crime. 98 Under the first factor, the extent of the narcotics operation,
including narcotics manufacture or transport, 99 coupled with a significant
quantity of narcotics' 00 supported an inference that, even though the
because "the gun and the crime were sufficiently connected"). Police found approximately fifteen
grams of powdered and rock cocaine, heroin, and forty-six diazepam pills. Id. at 115, 872 P.2d at 55.
Police also found baggies commonly used for packaging cocaine and heroin, a cocaine grinder,
scales, a pager, and $5,737. Id.
95. 91 Wash. App. 874, 960 P.2d 955 (1998).
96. Id. at 877, 960 P.2d at 957.
97. See id. at 883, 960 P.2d at 960.
98. See State v. Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d 562, 574, 55 P.3d 632, 639 (2002) (plurality opinion).
99. See, e.g., id. at 563, 55 P.3d at 633 (noting defendant was arrested with weapon while
manufacturing marijuana with intent to deliver); State v. Valdobinos, 122 Wash. 2d 270, 274, 858
P.2d 199, 202 (1993) (noting defendant was arrested with weapon while in possession of cocaine
with intent to deliver); State v. Holt, 119 Wash. App. 712, 715, 82 P.3d 688, 690 (2004) (noting
defendant was arrested with weapon while manufacturing methamphetamine); State v. Johnson, 94
Wash. App. 882, 888, 974 P.2d 855, 858 (1999) (noting defendant was arrested with weapon for
possession of heroin with intent to deliver); Simonson, 91 Wash. App. at 876, 960 P.2d at 957
(noting defendant convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine); State v. Williams, 85 Wash. App.
508, 510, 933 P.2d 1072, 1074 (1997) (noting defendant was arrested with weapon for delivery of
cocaine), rev'd on other grounds, 135 Wash. 2d 365, 957 P.2d 216 (1998); State v. Mills, 80 Wash.
App. 231, 233, 907 P.2d 316, 317 (1995) (noting defendant was arrested with weapon while
possessing methamphetamine with intent to deliver); State v. Samaniego, 76 Wash. App. 76, 78,
882 P.2d 195, 196 (1994) (noting defendant was arrested with weapon while in possession of
cocaine with intent to deliver); State v. Call, 75 Wash. App. 866, 868, 880 P.2d 571, 571 (1994)
(noting defendant was arrested with weapon while in possession of marijuana with intent to
manufacture); State v. Taylor, 74 Wash. App. 111, 125, 872 P.2d 53, 60 (1994) (noting defendant
was arrested with weapon while in possession of narcotics and other materials indicating an intent to
deliver); State v. Sabala, 44 Wash. App. 444, 445, 723 P.2d 5, 6 (1986) (noting defendant was
arrested with weapon while in possession of heroin with intent to deliver).
100. See, e.g., Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 564, 55 P.3d at 634 (noting defendant had seventy rooted
marijuana plants, fifty starter plants, large amounts of harvested marijuana, and dried marijuana
leaves worth at least $240,000); Valdobinos, 122 Wash. 2d at 274, 858 P.2d at 202 (noting federal
authorities found 846 grams of cocaine); Simonson, 91 Wash. App. at 878, 960 P.2d at 958 (noting
police found 10,000 pseudoephedrine pills in defendant's trailer and the prosecutor presented
evidence at trial that a manufacturer had shipped at least 30,000 pills to Simonson or his
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defendant did not actually possess the weapon, he or she was using it in
connection with the possession of narcotics. Under the second factor,
courts have not explained how the type of weapon might itself
demonstrate a connection between the weapon and the crime, but courts
have identified the weapon at issue in their analysis.' 01 Finally, under the
third factor, courts relied on two "circumstances" to support an inference
that the defendant was using the weapon in relation to the crime: first,
whether the defendant intentionally positioned and prepared the weapon
in a particular manner, 102 and second, whether the defendant
intentionally maintained a substantial number of weapons. 0 3
Applying this three-factor analysis, the Schelin plurality determined
that the evidence entitled the jury to infer that Schelin used his weapon
to protect his basement marijuana-growing operation, creating a
weapon-crime nexus. 104 Under the first factor, the Schelin plurality
considered the nature of the crime. 105 Schelin operated a marijuana-
growing operation in his basement, which involved 120 marijuana plants
in various growth stages, harvested marijuana, measuring and packaging
tools, and significant amounts of cash. 0 6 This extensive drug operation
represented a significant asset that warranted the protection of a deadly
weapon.107 Under the second factor, the plurality considered the type of
accomplices); Mills, 80 Wash. App. at 233, 907 P.2d at 317 (noting defendant had 118 grams of
methamphetamine); Call, 75 Wash. App. at 868, 880 P.2d at 571 (noting officers found cocaine,
LSD, marijuana, and a marijuana-growing operation); Taylor, 74 Wash. App. at 115, 872 P.2d at 55
(noting officers found fifteen grams of cocaine, one gram of black tar heroin, and forty-six diazepam
pills); Sabala, 44 Wash. App. at 445, 723 P.2d at 6 (noting defendant was attempting to deliver
more than twenty-five grams of heroin).
101. See, e.g., Simonson, 91 Wash. App. at 877-78, 960 P.2d at 957-58 (holding defendant in
constructive possession of seven weapons, including two semi-automatic pistols and an assault rifle,
was armed); Sabala, 44 Wash. App. at 445, 723 P.2d at 6 (determining defendant who had
constructive possession of semi-automatic gun was armed).
102. See, e.g., Sabala, 44 Wash. App. at 445, 723 P.2d at 6 (determining defendant positioned
fully loaded semi-automatic gun under seat for easy access).
103. See, e.g., Simonson, 91 Wash. App. at 877-78, 960 P.2d at 957-58 (determining defendants
maintained at least seven weapons, including at least four loaded weapons, on premises of
methamphetamine operation).
104. See Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 574, 55 P.3d at 639.
105. See id. at 574-75, 55 P.3d at 639 (noting right to bear firearms which further commission of
crime, such as Schelin's marijuana-growing operation and intent to deliver, is not constitutionally
protected).
106. Id. at 564, 55 P.3d at 634.
107. See id. at 574, 55 P.3d at 639. Police found $50,000 in gold coins and cash. Id. at 564, 55
P.3d at 634. Police also found seventy rooted plants, fifty starter plants, large amounts of harvested
marijuana, and dried marijuana leaves. Id. Based on a detective's testimony that one marijuana plant
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weapon: a loaded revolver. 10 8 Finally, under the third factor, the plurality
considered the circumstances under which police found the weapon. 10 9
Schelin testified that he intentionally hung the weapon near the door to
facilitate its use if necessary. 110 The gun hung in the midst of the
narcotics operation,"' and Schelin stood near this weapon when police
entered. 112 Therefore, his choice and the positioning of the weapon
permitted the jury to infer that he was using the weapon to protect the
narcotics operation. 113 The plurality's three-factor analysis highlighted
evidence showing Schelin's "apparent ability to protect [his] grow
operation with a deadly weapon," which supported the jury's finding of a
weapon-crime nexus and rendered Schelin armed."
14
In sum, a court must apply two tests to determine whether a defendant
is armed in constructive possession cases. 115 First, a court must
determine whether the evidence shows that the weapon was easily
accessible. 1 6 Second, a court must apply a two-part nexus test. 1 7 The
State may satisfy the weapon-defendant nexus requirement by showing
proximity. 118 Then a court must consider three weapon-crime nexus
factors to determine whether the evidence entitles the fact-finder to infer
that the defendant was using the weapon in connection with the crime."
9
If the three-factor analysis supports this inference, then the trier of fact
may conclude that the defendant was armed for purposes of the Deadly
Weapon Enhancement. 120 Without support for this inference, however,
the trier of fact cannot find a defendant armed as a matter of law.
has a street value of up to $2,000, id. at 564 n.1, 55 P.3d at 634 n.1, Schelin's operation was worth
at least $290,000.
108. See id. at 564, 55 P.3d at 634.
109. See id. Police officers found in the basement a loaded revolver stored in a holster, which
hung from the wall six to ten feet from where Schelin stood. Id.
110. Id. at 573-74, 55 P.3d at 638-39.
111. Id. at 564, 55 P.3d at 634.
112. Id. at 573, 55 P.3d at 638.
113. See id. at 574, 55 P.3d at 639.
114. Id. at 574-75, 55 P.3d at 639 (emphasis added).
115. See id. at 567-68, 55 P.3d at 636.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 573-74, 55 P.3d at 638-39.
119. See id. at 570, 55 P.3d at 637.
120. See id. at 574-75, 55 P.3d at 639 (affirming conclusion that defendant was armed when
proper application of weapon--crime nexus permitted inference that defendant "was using the
weapon to protect his basement marijuana-growing operation").
Vol. 80:165, 2005
The Weapon-Crime Nexus
III. THE GURSKE COURT FAILED TO APPLY BOTH OF THE
REQUIRED TESTS
In State v. Gurske, Division III affirmed the application of the Deadly
Weapon Enhancement to Gurske's sentence for possession of
methamphetamine. 121 After arresting Gurske for driving with a
suspended license, the police inventoried his truck and found a
zipped-closed backpack behind the driver's seat.1 22 After opening the
backpack, the police found three grams of methamphetamine, 123an
unloaded pistol in a holster, a loaded magazine, and Gurske's wallet. 124
At trial, the parties stipulated that the driver could not remove the
backpack without either exiting the truck or moving into the passenger
seat, even though the backpack was within arm's reach of the driver's
position. 125 The trial judge applied the Deadly Weapon Enhancement to
Gurske's sentence for possession of a controlled substance because the
backpack was within arm's reach, even though it could not be accessed
immediately. 126 Division III affirmed on the same basis.127
Before concluding that Gurske was armed, Division III acknowledged
that constructive possession cases like Gurske require the State to satisfy
both the easily accessible and the two-part nexus test. 128 Applying the
easily accessible test, the court noted that the proximity between Gurske
and the backpack containing the pistol rendered the weapon "easily
accessible."'129 Turning to the nexus test, the Gurske court found that this
proximity also established both the weapon-defendant nexus and the
weapon-crime nexus. 130 In his dissent, Judge Schultheis noted that this
mere proximity, without further evidence, fails to render a defendant
121. State v. Gurske, 120 Wash. App. 63, 64, 83 P.3d 1051, 1052 (2004), review granted, 152
Wash. 2d 1013, 101 P.3d 108 (2004).
122. Id. at 67, 83 P.3d at 1054 (Schultheis, J., dissenting).
123. The most recent case considering the value of methamphetamine noted that in 2000, police
estimated that 0.9 grams of methamphetamine had a street value between $70 and $150. State v.
Ceglowski, 103 Wash. App. 346, 348-49, 12 P.3d 160, 161-62 (2000).
124. Gurske, 120 Wash. App. at 65-66, 83 P.3d at 1052-53.
125. See id. at 64-65, 83 P.3d at 1052.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 65-66, 83 P.3d at 1053.
129. See id. at 65, 83 P.3d at 1053.
130. See id. at 66, 83 P.3d at 1053 (noting backpack contained pistol, narcotics, and Gurske's
wallet).
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armed. 131 In addition, the Gurske court relied on the presence of
Gurske's wallet in the backpack with the pistol and the narcotics to
satisfy the nexus test.' 32 The Gurske court never referred to the three
weapon-crime nexus factors, nor to the potential inference that Gurske
was using his weapon in furtherance of his possession of
methamphetamine.13 3 Instead, the court acknowledged that the pistol was
not as easily accessible as the fully loaded weapon positioned directly
under the driver's seat in Sabala, but was nonetheless accessible like the
weapon that sat on a table beside the defendant in Taylor.'34 The Gurske
court thus affirmed the trial court's determination on the basis of
accessibility and proximity and failed to apply the nexus test. 35
IV. THE EVIDENCE IN GURSKE DOES NOT SATISFY THE
WEAPON-CRIME NEXUS TEST
Under a proper application of the weapon-crime nexus test, the
Gurske evidence shows nothing more than constructive possession and
cannot support the critical inference that the weapon was related to the
commission of the crime. 136 Therefore, Gurske was not armed for
purposes of the Deadly Weapon Enhancement, and the Gurske court
erred in affirming the trial court's ruling. 137 Under Schelin, close
proximity between a defendant and a weapon during commission of a
crime does not render a defendant armed within the meaning of the
Deadly Weapon Enhancement. 138 Without additional evidence that
establishes more than mere proximity in cases of constructive possession,
a trier of fact may not infer that a defendant was using a deadly weapon
in connection with the crime. 139 In contrast, the Gurske court's
determination that a nexus existed turned on the trial judge's finding that
the backpack containing the weapon, the drugs, and the wallet lay close
131. See id. at 67, 83 P.3d at 1054 (Schultheis, J., dissenting).
132. See id. at 65-66, 83 P.3d at 1053.
133. See id. at 66, 83 P.3d at 1053.
134. See id. at 66, 83 P.3d at 1053.
135. See id. at 67-68, 83 P.3d at 1053-54 (Schultheis, J., dissenting).
136. See State v. Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d 562, 570, 55 P.3d 632, 637 (2002) (plurality opinion)
(citing with approval State v. Johnson, 94 Wash. App. 882, 895, 974 P.2d 855, 861 (1999)).
137. See Gurske, 120 Wash. App. at 67, 83 P.3d at 1053 (Schultheis, J., dissenting).
138. See Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 570, 55 P.3d at 637 (describing framework for identifying
additional facts relevant to this inquiry).
139. See id.
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to Gurske.140 The Gurske court thus erred in relying on evidence of mere
proximity, which fails to satisfy the weapon-crime nexus requirement.1 4 1
The Gurske court further erred because application of the Schelin factors
demonstrates Gurske's mere constructive possession of a weapon that
lay in close proximity, which fails to support the inference that a
weapon-crime nexus exists.
42
A. The Gurske Court Erred In Allowing Mere Proximity to Satisfy
Both Parts of the Nexus Test
By interpreting both parts of the nexus test to require mere
proximity, 143 the Gurske decision frustrates the purpose of the Schelin
decision by effectively rendering the nexus test indistinguishable from
the easily accessible test.1 44 The Schelin court intended to adopt a second,
independent test to clarify those facts necessary to allow the trier of fact
to infer that a constructively possessed weapon was in fact connected to
a crime. 45 The trial judge concluded that Gurske was armed because the
backpack and the weapon lay in close proximity to him. 146 Concluding
that this fact satisfied both the easily accessible test and the nexus test,
Division III affirmed the trial judge's conclusion on the same basis. 47
The proximity between the pistol and Gurske supported the Gurske
court's determination that the State satisfied the easily accessible test and
the weapon-defendant nexus test. 48 Mere proximity does not, however,
satisfy the weapon-crime nexus test. 149 By relying on the proximity
between Gurske and the backpack to satisfy both tests, the Gurske court
140. See Gurske, 120 Wash. App. at 64, 83 P.3d at 1052.
141. See Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 570, 55 P.3d at 637.
142. See id. at 574, 55 P.3d at 639.
143. See Gurske, 120 Wash. App. at 64-66, 83 P.3d at 1052-53.
144. See Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 570, 55 P.3d at 637 (noting court was asked to review
"seemingly inconsistent applications of nexus tests by the court of appeals concerning the deadly
weapon sentence enhancement").
145. See id. (agreeing with Johnson court that mere presence of weapon at crime scene does not
establish weapon--crime nexus and identifying three factors that court should consider to move
beyond mere proximity, State v. Johnson, 94 Wash. App. 882, 895, 974 P.2d 855, 861 (1999)).
146. See id.
147. See id. ("The trial judge concluded from [the stipulation that the backpack holding the pistol
was within arm's reach] that Gurske was armed .... ).
148. See id. at 574, 55 P.3d at 639 (concluding Schelin's "close proximity" to loaded gun
satisfied easily accessible test and established weapon-defendant nexus).
149. See id. at 570, 55 P.3d at 637.
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failed to apply the weapon-crime nexus test. 5 '
The Gurske court attempted to distinguish its application of the nexus
test from the easily accessible test by noting that Gurske's wallet also lay
in the bag. 151 The presence of Gurske's wallet, however, simply
establishes his constructive possession of the weapon. 152 Mere
constructive possession does not satisfy the separate nexus requirement
and precludes a finding that Gurske was armed absent a weapon-crime
nexus. 153 The Gurske court therefore erred in finding Gurske armed
based on his mere constructive possession of the backpack that lay in
close proximity to him.
1 4
B. Gurske Was Not Armed Because the Evidence Fails to Satisfy the
Three Schelin Factors
A proper analysis of the Gurske evidence under the weapon-crime
nexus test shows that Gurske was not armed under the Deadly Weapon
Enhancement because the evidence fails to show more than mere
proximity between the weapon and the drugs forming the basis of
Gurske's crime.15 5 Gurske's weapon and drugs lay within reach of the
driver's seat. 156 This proximity may satisfy both the easily accessible
test 57 and the weapon-defendant nexus test, 58 but fails to satisfy the
150. See State v. Gurske, 120 Wash. App. 63, 64-66, 83 P.3d 1051, 1052-53 (2004), review
granted, 152 Wash. 2d 1013, 101 P.3d 108 (2004).
151. See id. at 66, 83 P.3d at 1053.
152. See State v. Valdobinos, 122 Wash. 2d 270, 282, 858 P.2d 199, 206 (1993) (concluding
presence of defendant's personal effects, including bus ticket bearing his name lying next to 846
grams of cocaine did not render defendant armed even in presence of unloaded rifle); State v.
Simonson, 91 Wash. App. 874, 881-82, 960 P.2d 955, 959 (1998) (concluding presence of
defendant's personal effects, including wallet, only established constructive possession of weapons);
State v. Call, 75 Wash. App. 866, 868-69, 880 P.2d 571, 571-72 (1994) (holding documents found
in house established defendant's constructive possession of handguns, but such constructive
possession did not render him armed).
153. See Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 574, 55 P.3d at 639 (concluding evidence establishing
constructive possession of easily accessible deadly weapon did not show defendant was armed
absent additional satisfaction of nexus test).
154. See id. at 570, 55 P.3d at 637.
155. See id.
156. See Gurske, 120 Wash. App. at 65, 83 P.3d at 1052.
157. See id. at 65, 83 P.3d at 1053 (stating proximity between backpack and driver's seat satisfies
easily accessible and readily available test).
158. See id. at 66, 83 P.3d at 1053 (explaining proximity between weapon and Gurske satisfies
weapon-crime nexus).
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weapon-crime nexus test. 15 9 The totality of the circumstances, including
the nature of Gurske's crime, the type of weapon, and the circumstances
under which police found the weapon, do not entitle a trier of fact to
infer that the gun was in fact related to the drug possession. 160 Without
this inference, Gurske was not armed, despite the fact that the backpack
lay within arm's reach from the driver's seat.
16 1
1. Gurske's Possession of a Small Amount of Drugs Does Not Support
an Inference that Gurske Was Using His Gun to Protect the Drugs
First, the nature of the crime and the small quantity of drugs found in
Gurske's possession do not support the finding of a weapon-crime
nexus. 162 The weapon-crime nexus requires a connection between the
weapon and the crime, and a court must consider whether evidence
relating to the nature of the crime implicates this connection.' 63 In other
drug possession cases, the significant value of the narcotics involved
supported an inference that the defendant was using the weapon in
connection with the narcotics.'64 In addition, evidence that the defendant
159. See Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 570, 55 P.3d at 637 (agreeing with Johnson court that mere
presence of weapon at crime scene does not establish defendant as armed without additional
evidence, State v. Johnson, 94 Wash. App. 882, 895, 974 P.2d 855, 861).
160. Compare id. at 574-75, 55 P.3d at 639 (concluding jury was entitled to infer Schelin "was
using the weapon to protect his basement marijuana grow operation" on basis of evidence
establishing that when police entered home defendant stood near weapon he had intentionally
loaded and hung on wall in midst of marijuana-growing operation to permit easy access to weapon),
with Gurske, 120 Wash. App. at 64-65, 83 P.3d at 1052 (disregarding evidence that Gurske could
not access backpack containing weapon and drugs as driver without taking additional steps, failed to
access or attempt to access backpack when pulled over while driving, and police did not even
discover pistol or methamphetamine until they arrested Gurske, impounded truck, and inventoried
contents at station).
161. See Gurske, 120 Wash. App. at 64, 83 P.3d at 1052.
162. See id. at 66, 83 P.3d at 1053. Gurske was convicted of possession of three grams of
methamphetamine. Id. In 2000, police estimated that 0.9 grams of methamphetamine had a street
value between $70 and $150. State v. Ceglowski, 103 Wash. App. 346, 348-49, 12 P.3d 160, 161-
62 (2000). Under this estimation, Gurske possessed methamphetamine with a street value of at least
$210 to $450. In contrast, in Schelin, the defendant's operation at the time of his arrest was worth at
least $290,000. See supra note 107.
163. See Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 574-75, 56 P.3d at 639 (noting marijuana-growing operation
might warrant protection).
164. See, e.g., id. at 564, 55 P.3d at 634 (noting defendant had seventy rooted marijuana plants,
fifty starter plants, large amounts of harvested marijuana, and dried marijuana leaves worth at least
$240,000); State v. Valdobinos, 122 Wash. 2d 270, 274, 858 P.2d 199, 202 (1993) (noting federal
authorities found 846 grams of cocaine); State v. Simonson, 91 Wash. App. 874, 878, 960 P.2d 955,
958 (1998) (noting police found 10,000 pseudoephedrine pills in defendant's trailer and the
prosecutor presented evidence at trial that a manufacturer had shipped at least 30,000 pills to
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was producing or transporting these drugs, particularly if the defendant
was engaged in this activity when law enforcement officers discovered
the weapon, implicates the weapon-crime nexus. 165 For example, the
weapon-crime nexus existed in Sabala, where the defendant was
arrested while transporting more than twenty-five grams of heroin.1 66
This nexus also existed in Taylor, where the defendant possessed fifteen
grams of cocaine, one gram of heroin, and forty-six diazepam pills. 167
Similarly, the nexus existed in Simonson, where police found 10,000
pseudoephedrine pills, used for manufacturing methamphetamine, 168 and
in Schelin, where police found 120 marijuana plants, large amounts of
harvested marijuana, and marijuana leaves. 169 Thus, such evidence
supports the inference that the weapon-crime nexus existed in
constructive possession cases. 170 In contrast, Gurske possessed only
three grams of methamphetamine. 171 The evidence does not show that
Simonson or his accomplices); State v. Mills, 80 Wash. App. 231, 233, 907 P.2d 316, 317 (1995)
(noting defendant had 118 grams of methamphetamine); State v. Call, 75 Wash. App. 866, 868, 880
P.2d 571, 571 (1994) (noting officers found cocaine, LSD, marijuana, and a marijuana-growing
operation); State v. Taylor, 74 Wash. App. 111, 115, 872 P.2d 53, 55 (1994) (noting officers found
fifteen grams of cocaine, one gram of black tar heroin, and forty-six diazepam pills); State v. Sabala,
44 Wash. App. 444, 445, 723 P.2d 5, 6 (1986) (noting defendant was attempting to deliver more
than twenty-five grams of heroin).
165. See, e.g., Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 563, 55 P.3d at 633 (noting defendant was arrested with
weapon while manufacturing marijuana with intent to deliver); Valdobinos, 122 Wash. 2d at 274,
858 P.2d at 202 (noting defendant was arrested with weapon while in possession of cocaine with
intent to deliver); State v. Holt, 119 Wash. App. 712, 715, 82 P.3d 688, 690 (2004) (noting
defendant was arrested with weapon while manufacturing methamphetamine); State v. Johnson, 94
Wash. App. 882, 888, 974 P.2d 855, 858 (1999) (noting defendant was arrested with weapon for
possession of heroin with intent to deliver); Simonson, 91 Wash. App. at 876, 960 P.2d at 957
(noting defendant convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine); State v. Williams, 85 Wash. App.
508, 510, 933 P.2d 1072, 1074 (1997) (noting defendant was arrested with weapon for delivery of
cocaine), revd on other grounds, 135 Wash. 2d 365, 957 P.2d 216 (1998); Mills, 80 Wash. App. at
233, 907 P.2d at 317 (noting defendant was arrested with weapon while possessing
methamphetamine with intent to deliver); State v. Samaniego, 76 Wash. App. 76, 78, 882 P.2d 195,
196 (1994) (noting defendant was arrested with weapon while in possession of cocaine with intent
to deliver); Call, 75 Wash. App. at 868, 880 P.2d at 571 (noting defendant was arrested with weapon
while in possession of marijuana with intent to manufacture); Taylor, 74 Wash. App. at 125, 872
P.2d at 60 (noting defendant was arrested with weapon while in possession of narcotics and other
materials indicating an intent to deliver); Sabala, 44 Wash. App. at 445, 723 P.2d at 6 (noting
defendant was arrested with weapon while in possession of heroin with intent to deliver).
166. See Sabala, 44 Wash. App. at 445, 723 P.2d at 6.
167. See Taylor, 74 Wash. App. at 123, 872 P.2d at 59.
168. See Simonson, 91 Wash. App. at 877-78, 960 P.2d at 957-58.
169. See Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 564, 55 P.3d at 634.
170. See id. at 572, 55 P.3d at 638.
171. State v. Gurske, 120 Wash. App. 63, 66, 83 P.3d 1051, 1053 (2004), review granted, 152
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Gurske intended to deliver these narcotics or that he maintained a
narcotics operation, and the State refrained from charging him with a
crime more serious than possession of narcotics.172 Further, the evidence
does not show that the narcotics represented either a significant asset for
Gurske or a manufacturing operation. 173 Rather, the State presented
evidence showing only that the weapon lay next to the narcotics.
174
Absent evidence showing more than this proximity, the nature of
Gurske's crime does not support the inference that he was using his
weapon to further his crime of possession.
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2. The Circumstances Surrounding the Discovery of Gurske's Gun Do
Not Support a Weapon-Crime Nexus
Neither Gurske's choice of weapon, 176 nor the circumstances under
which police later found the weapon, 177 implicates the weapon-crime
nexus. Gurske's choice of weapon, a pistol, does not demonstrate a
relationship with the crime of narcotics possession.1 78 The circumstances
surrounding the discovery of Gurske's weapon similarly fail to support a
connection between the weapon and the crime. 179 In previous cases
addressing the weapon-crime nexus, courts relied on two
"circumstances" to support an inference that the defendant was using the
weapon in relation to the crime: first, whether the defendant intentionally
positioned and prepared the weapon in a particular manner, 180 and
Wash. 2d 1013, 101 P.3d 108 (2004).
172. See id. at 65, 83 P.3d at 1052 (affirming Gurske's conviction for possession of
methamphetamine).
173. See id. at 66, 83 P.3d at 1053 (noting Gurske had only three grams ofmethamphetamine).
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 65, 83 P.3d at 1052 (finding Gurske's backpack contained a nine millimeter pistol
in a holster).
177. See id. at 64-65, 83 P.3d at 1052. Police found the weapon after impounding and
inventorying Gurske's truck. Id. Inside the truck, police found the unloaded pistol inside a
zipped-closed backpack. See id. at 67, 83 P.3d at 1054 (Schultheis, J., dissenting). Division III cited
the parties' stipulation at trial that the driver could not remove the backpack without first either
exiting the vehicle or moving into the passenger seat location. See id. at 64, 83 P.3d at 1052.
178. But see, e.g., State v. Simonson, 91 Wash. App. 874, 877-78, 960 P.2d 955, 957-58 (1998)
(holding defendant in constructive possession of seven weapons, including two semi-automatic
pistols and an assault rifle, was armed); State v. Sabala, 44 Wash. App. 444, 445, 723 P.2d 5, 6
(1986) (determining defendant who had constructive possession of semi-automatic gun was armed).
179. See Gurske, 120 Wash. App. at 67, 83 P.3d at 1054 (Schultheis, J., dissenting) (noting pistol
remained in backseat of Gurske's truck at all times inside holster inside zipped backpack).
180. See, e.g., Sabala, 44 Wash. App. at 445, 723 P.2d at 6 (determining defendant positioned
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second, whether the defendant intentionally maintained a substantial
number of weapons.'
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First, the evidence fails to show that Gurske intentionally positioned
his weapon or loaded it in preparation for use-in fact, it shows he did
not load it.182 In contrast, the intentional positioning and preparation of a
weapon permits the finding of a weapon-crime nexus.1 83 For example,
the defendant in Sabala prepared his gun by fully loading it before
placing it beneath the driver's seat with the grip easily accessible to
anyone sitting above; this evidence entitled the trier of fact to infer a
connection between the weapon's placement and the .intended delivery
of twenty-five grams of heroin. 184 Evidence entitled the trier of fact to
make a similar inference in Schelin, where the defendant stood near a
weapon that he intentionally hung fully loaded and ready for use outside
his basement marijuana-growing operation. 185 Also, in Taylor, the
evidence permitted a nexus inference where the defendant placed his
weapon on a table next to the couch where he was sitting in the midst of
a significant quantity of narcotics and measuring and packaging
implements. 1
86
In Gurske, the State presented no evidence that Gurske specifically
placed his unloaded weapon to allow for easy access, nor did it show
more than mere proximity between the weapon and the small quantity of
narcotics. 187 The evidence in Gurske's case does not demonstrate the
intentional preparation evident in Sabala or Schelin. In fact, Gurske
placed the backpack containing the weapon in such a manner that it was
less accessible to him as the driver-he could not reach his weapon
fully loaded semi-automatic gun under seat for easy access).
181. See, e.g., Simonson, 91 Wash. App. at 877-78, 960 P.2d at 957-58 (determining defendants
maintained at least seven weapons, including at least four loaded weapons, on premises of
methamphetamine operation).
182. See Gurske, 120 Wash. App. at 64-65, 83 P.3d at 1052. According to the Gurske opinion,
the parties stipulated that Gurske's backpack was not removable by the driver without first either
exiting the vehicle or moving into the passenger seat location. Id. at 65, 83 P.3d at 1052.
183. See, e.g., Sabala, 44 Wash. App. at 446-48, 723 P.2d at 6-8 (holding location and position
of weapon, fully loaded and accessible to driver, demonstrated nexus between weapon and
commission of crime); see also State v. Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d 562, 573-74, 55 P.3d 632, 638-39
(2002) (plurality opinion) (determining defendant stood near weapon he had loaded and placed on
the wall, which he testified enabled him to remove gun quickly when necessary).
184. See Sabala, 44 Wash. App. at 446, 723 P.2d at 6.
185. See Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d at 574, 55 P.3d at 639.
186. See State v. Taylor, 74 Wash. App. 11I, 125, 872 P.2d 53, 60 (1994).
187. See Gurske, 120 Wash. App. at 65-66, 83 P.3d at 1052.
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without taking additional steps. 188 Moreover, he left the weapon
unloaded, further demonstrating a lack of preparation.' 89 When police
pulled him over, Gurske remained in the driver's seat, where he lacked
immediate access to the weapon. 190 Although Gurske sat in proximity to
the weapon, as the defendant did in Taylor, he did not sit in the midst of
narcotics materials, nor was he in the process of packaging narcotics
with the intent to deliver. 191 While he placed the weapon in the same
backpack as the narcotics and a loaded magazine, evidence shows that he
left the gun unloaded, 192 zipped up the backpack, 193 and placed it in a
location that did not permit immediate access to the driver. 1
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Gurske's failure to maintain a significant number of weapons further
shows a lack of connection between the weapon and the crime beyond
mere proximity. 195 The Simonson court considered the substantial
number of weapons maintained by the defendants, including the storage
of seven guns, at least four of which were loaded, on the premises of
their methamphetamine-manufacturing site; this evidence supported an
inference that the defendants were using the guns to defend the site.' 96 In
contrast, Gurske possessed only one unloaded gun that he stored in the
backseat of his truck.1
97
If one considers Gurske's case in light of the three Schelin factors,
one cannot infer that Gurske was armed. Gurske's mere narcotics
possession does not correspond to the substantial narcotics operations,
including manufacture and delivery, that supported the finding of a
weapon-crime nexus in Schelin, Simonson, and Taylor. 198 Similarly,
188. See id. at 65, 83 P.3d at 1052.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id. (convicting Gurske of mere possession).
192. Although the Gurske court cited Schelin for the proposition that an unloaded gun satisfies the
Deadly Weapon Enhancement's requirements, id. at 64, 83 P.3d at 1052, the Schelin court noted
only that both loaded and unloaded firearms are deadly weapons for purposes of the Deadly Weapon
Enhancement. See State v. Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d 562, 567 n.2, 55 P.3d 632, 635 n.2 (2002)
(plurality opinion). As the Schelin court noted, however, evidence of an unloaded rifle under a bed
was insufficient to show a defendant was armed in Valdobinos. See id. at 567, 55 P.3d at 635 (citing
State v. Valdobinos, 122 Wash. 2d 270, 282, 858 P.2d 199, 206 (1993)).
193. See Gurske, 120 Wash. App. at 67-68, 83 P.3d at 1054 (Schultheis, J., dissenting).
194. See id. at 65, 83 P.3d at 1052.
195. See id.
196. See State v. Simonson, 91 Wash. App. 874, 883, 960 P.2d 955, 960 (1998).
197. See Gurske, 120 Wash. App. at 64, 83 P.3d at 1052.
198. See, e.g., Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d 562, 563--64, 55 P.3d 632, 633-34 (2002) (plurality
Washington Law Review Vol. 80:165, 2005
Gurske merely possessed a single, unloaded weapon,1 99 in contrast to the
small arsenal found in Simonson.200 Rather than placing a fully loaded
weapon beneath the driver's seat with the pistol grip immediately
accessible to him, as the defendant did in Sabala,20 1 Gurske placed his
unloaded weapon and drugs inside a backpack behind his seat in a
manner not immediately accessible to him. 202 Police did not even
discover the existence of the weapon or the methamphetamine until after
they had arrested Gurske, impounded his truck, and inventoried its
contents.20 3 Without more, these facts do not permit a court to find
anything more than proximity,20 4 and they certainly do not allow a trier
of fact to infer that Gurske was using the weapon in furtherance of his
crime. 20 5 Notably, the Gurske court failed to consider all of the relevant
evidence; the dissent detailed the full circumstances surrounding the
police's discovery of the weapon, including the fact that the backpack
remained zipped-closed. 206 The evidence in Gurske's case fails to
support an inference that Gurske was using the weapon in connection
with his possession of methamphetamine. Thus, the Gurske court erred
in finding him armed under the Deadly Weapon Enhancement.
opinion) (noting defendant, who had seventy rooted marijuana plants, fifty starter plants, large
amounts of harvested marijuana, and dried marijuana leaves worth at least $240,000, was arrested
with weapon while manufacturing marijuana with intent to deliver); Simonson, 91 Wash. App. at
876, 878, 960 P.2d at 957, 958 (noting police found 10,000 pseudoephedrine pills in defendant's
trailer, prosecutor presented evidence at trial that manufacturer had shipped at least 30,000 pills to
Simonson or his accomplices, and defendant was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine);
State v. Taylor, 74 Wash. App. 111, 115, 125, 872 P.2d 53, 55, 60 (1994) (noting defendant was
arrested with weapon while in possession of fifteen grams of cocaine, one gram of black tar heroin,
forty-six diazepam pills, and other materials indicating an intent to deliver).
199. See Gurske, 120 Wash. App. at 64, 83 P.3d at 1052.
200. See Simonson, 91 Wash. App. at 877-78, 960 P.2d at 957-58 (noting police found six guns
in bedroom, as well as two shotguns and an assault rifle stashed around house).
201. See State v. Sabala, 44 Wash. App. 444, 445, 723 P.2d 5, 6 (1986).
202. See Gurske, 120 Wash. App. at 64-65, 83 P.3d at 1052.
203. Id. at 64, 83 P.3d at 1052.
204. See State v. Mills, 80 Wash. App. 231, 235, 907 P.2d 316, 317 (1995) ("[A] defendant in
constructive possession of a deadly weapon, even if that weapon is next to controlled substances, is
not 'armed."' (emphasis added)).
205. See State v. Schelin, 147 Wash. 2d 562, 575, 55 P.3d 632, 639 (2002) (plurality opinion)
(stating defendant has no constitutional right to bear arms when weapons further the commission of
a crime).
206. See Gurske, 120 Wash. App. at 67-68, 83 P.3d at 1053-54 (Schultheis, J., dissenting).
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C. The Gurske Court Failed to Consider Gurske's Possession of the
Gun in Light of the Deadly Weapon Enhancement's Purpose
Without applying the weapon-crime nexus test to the evidence in
Gurske's case, the Gurske court failed to construe the term "armed" in
light of the purpose of the Deadly Weapon Enhancement. When
construing ambiguous terms within a statute, it is a court's duty to
ascertain and give effect to the intent and purpose of the language chosen
by the legislature.2 °7 In the criminal context, this requires courts to apply
a literal and strict interpretation to the language at issue. 208 The
Washington State Legislature explicitly stated that the Deadly Weapon
Enhancement should apply only where a defendant armed himself or
herself with a deadly weapon during commission of a crime. 20 9 The
legislature did not criminalize mere possession, and the underlying
purpose of the statute is to implicate a defendant only where there is a
possibility the defendant would use the weapon in connection with the
crime.210 Thus, in Sabala, Division III found that, even though the
defendant was not technically armed, his intentional positioning of the
weapon permitted an inference that he armed himself to further his
heroin delivery.21' In contrast, the Gurske court determined that Gurske
was armed simply because the backpack lay within reach of the driver's
seat.212 Unlike the State in Sabala, the State in Gurske presented no
evidence that Gurske took steps to arm himself. 213 Rather, the State
presented evidence that Gurske left the weapon unloaded, put it in a
backpack, zipped the backpack closed, and placed it behind the driver's
seat, where he could not remove it while driving. 21 4 Lacking evidence
that Gurske took steps like the Sabala defendant to "arm" himself, the
State proved only that Gurske had constructive possession of a weapon
while he possessed methamphetamine.21 5 In light of the legislature's
choice to punish defendants who actually arm themselves, the Gurske
207. See State v. Wilson, 125 Wash. 2d 212, 216-17, 883 P.2d 320, 322-23 (1994).
208. See id.
209. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.602 (2004).
210. See State v. Johnson, 94 Wash. App. 882, 896, 974 P.2d 855, 862 (1999).
211. See id.; State v. Sabala, 44 Wash. App. 444, 448-49, 723 P.2d 5, 8 (1986).
212. See State v. Gurske, 120 Wash. App. 63, 64, 83 P.3d 1051, 1052 (2004), review granted, 152
Wash. 2d 1013, 101 P.3d 108 (2004).
213. See id. at 67, 83 P.3d at 1054 (Schultheis, J., dissenting).
214. See id.
215. See id. at 66, 83 P.3d at 1053.
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court erred in extending the Deadly Weapon Enhancement's application
to mere constructive possession.
V. CONCLUSION
The Gurske court should not have affirmed the trial judge's
conclusion that Gurske was armed and should have reversed the
application of the Deadly Weapon Enhancement to his conviction for
methamphetamine possession. In Gurske's case, the State presented
evidence establishing only that the backpack holding the weapon and the
drugs lay within arm's reach of the driver's seat.216 Although the Gurske
court acknowledged both the easily accessible and nexus tests, it limited
its analysis to proximity between the weapon, Gurske, and the drugs and
failed to apply the weapon-crime nexus.217 Even if the Gurske court had
considered the three Schelin factors, the evidence does not support an
inference that Gurske was using the unloaded pistol in connection with
his crime of possession.218 Without this inference, the Gurske court erred
in finding him armed and affirming the trial judge's enhancement of his
sentence. 219 The Washington State Supreme Court should therefore
reverse the application of the Deadly Weapon Enhancement to Gurske's
sentence for possession of narcotics.
216. See id. at 64, 83 P.3d at 1052.
217. See id. at 66, 83 P.3d at 1053.
218. See State v. Mills, 80 Wash. App. 231, 235-36, 907 P.2d 316, 317-18 (1995) (concluding
defendant in mere constructive possession of deadly weapon, even if weapon lies next to controlled
substances, is not armed within meaning of Deadly Weapon Enhancement).
219. See id.
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